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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with regard to resources, security 
and ultimately prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of Europe’s economy relies directly 
or indirectly on it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries industries and their related activities. It is also 
shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, maritime and coastal tourism, 
aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the protection of the marine 
environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats posed by unlawful activities, 
such as drugs trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Piracy in 
international waters also constitutes a threat to Europe since it can disrupt the maritime transport chain. 
These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine resources and the environment, as well as 
significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local security. It is anticipated that these risks 
and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to keep Europe as a world leader in the global 
maritime economy, an effective integrated/interoperable, sustainable maritime surveillance system and 
situational awareness are needed. 
 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, 
smuggling, piracy and terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster and more 
difficult to detect using conventional means. Hence, it is very important to find out the feasibility of 
using SAR Satellite images for small boat detection. Since 2008 the EC-JRC has carried out a number 
of SAR Small Boat detection experiments to assess the feasibility of using Spaceborne SAR for Small 
Boat detection. This report presents the results and conclusions of the coupled UAS and spaceborne 
SAR small boat detection campaign on coastal waters carried out by the EC-JRC in Porto Corallo, 
Sardinia, Italy from on 29 October 2010. 
 
The results of this coupled UAS/Spaceborne SAR small boat detection experiment show the potential 
of UAS for maritime surveillance and that small boat detection in spaceborne SAR is possible under 
suitable conditions of sea state, wind speed and incidence angle. In fact, the experiment highlights how 
a UAS can fill in the maritime surveillance gap between ship-borne and land-based surveillance assets 
and spaceborne SAR. For instance, spaceborne SAR allows small boat detection under suitable sea and 
wind conditions. However, it neither allows classification nor identification of small boats. A UAS 
besides detection also allows classification and identification.  Hence, since most unlawful activities in 
the maritime domain, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and piracy 
involve small boats the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance is very high. However, Before UAS 
can be routinely used for maritime surveillance in non-segregated airspace, a significant number of key 
issues related to critical UAS systems have to be addressed, namely command and control issues, 
telecommunications (e.g. change over from Line of Sight (LOS) to Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) 
Satcom), hand over of Air Traffic Control (ATC) between military and civil, collision avoidance 
systems, cross-border issues, flight plan modifications, contingency procedures, legal framework and 
regulations, etc.. Other interesting lines of research are UAS formation flying issues, patterns for 
optimal surveillance, onboard data fusion, full autonomy and endurance and altitude issues.  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
JRC - Alenia Aeronautica Coupled UAS / Spaceborne SAR Campaign Oct. 2010 Page 2 
 
 
 
1. – Introduction 
 
1.1 – Scope 
 
This report presents the key findings of the coupled UAS and Spaceborne SAR Small Boat 
Detection Campaign, led by the EC-JRC and conducted jointly with Alenia Aeronautica in Quirra, 
Sardinia-Italy in October 2010.  
 
This study addresses the potential of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for maritime surveillance 
and the feasibility of using UAS as a complementary technology on an operational basis. 
  
To answer this statement of work, a multinational cross-disciplinary consortium with research and 
operational expertise in maritime surveillance and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) was assembled 
with organisations involved in: 
 
1.- research in maritime surveillance using Spaceborne SAR imagery and in the processing and 
analysis of SAR imagery, as well as coordination and management of maritime surveillance 
campaigns (European Commission-JRC). 
2.- experience with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) campaigns (Alenia Aeronautica). 
 
     
1.2 – Main Objectives 
 
The work was performed with the following main objectives: 
 
 To acquire hands-on experience with UAS technologies, in particular with its possible 
applications to maritime surveillance.  
 
 To assess the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance, including small boat detection, illegal 
immigration and drugs trafficking mitigation.  
 
 To study the feasibility of using UAS as a complementary maritime surveillance technology on 
an operational basis together with currently used technologies.  
 
 To identify the main limiting factors preventing the use of UAS and enabling factors that could 
help to facilitate the operational use of UAS for maritime surveillance.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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1.3 – Context 
 
Problem Statement – The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with 
regard to resources, security and ultimately prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of 
Europe’s economy relies directly or indirectly on it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries industries 
and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, 
maritime and coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the 
protection of the marine environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats 
posed by unlawful activities, such as drugs trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised 
crime and terrorism. Piracy in international waters also constitutes a threat to Europe since it can 
disrupt the maritime transport chain. These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine 
resources and the environment, as well as significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local 
security. It is anticipated that these risks and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to 
keep Europe as a world leader in the global maritime economy, an effective integrated/interoperable, 
sustainable maritime surveillance system and situational awareness are needed.   
 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs 
trafficking, smuggling, piracy and terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster 
and more difficult to detect using conventional means. Hence, it is very important to find out the 
feasibility of using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) on an operational basis as a complementary 
maritime surveillance technology to currently used maritime surveillance assets, such as spaceborne 
SAR, coastal radars, ship-borne radars, etc. 
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2. – Research Method 
 
In order to find out the potential and feasibility of using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for 
maritime surveillance, including small boat detection, a controlled experiment on open sea and along 
the coast was designed, set up and executed. The controlled experiment is briefly described next. 
 
The controlled experiment consisted of a UAS (Alenia Aeronautica Sky-Y) flight over the area of the 
Poligono di Tiro in Porto Corallo, Sardinia at the approximate time of a SAR Satellite pass 
(TerraSAR-X). The Sky-Y took-off from Decimomanu military airbase in Sardinia, Italy and flew 
about 75Km towards the Poligono di Tiro of the Italian Air Force in Porto Corallo were the 
experiment tests took place.  
 
The experiment was divided into two phases, namely:  
 
1.) an open sea/coastal waters phase and  
2.) an along the coast phase. These two phases are described next. 
 
 
2.1 – Controlled Experiment on Open Sea/ Coastal Waters 
 
One of the main objectives of this controlled experiment was to find out the potential of using UAS 
for maritime surveillance on open sea/coastal waters. To that end, two small boats, namely an 8-meter 
rubber boat and a 16-meter fishing boat were deployed on open sea/coastal waters within the area of 
the Poligono di Tiro of Porto Corallo. The UAS capabilities were then tested. The tests comprised 
flying over the above mentioned area and the detection, tracking, classification and identification of 
the two boats deployed.  
 
 
2.2 – Controlled Experiment Along the Coast and Beach 
 
Another objective of this controlled experiment was to find out the potential of using UAS for 
maritime surveillance along the coast and beach. The rationales behind it being testing the capabilities 
of UAS to detect, classify and identify targets on land (e.g. small boats, people, etc.). To that end, 
three people, were deployed on land near the sea walking along the coast within the area of the the 
Poligono di Tiro of Porto Corallo. The UAS capabilities were then tested. The tests comprised flying 
over the above mentioned area and the detection, tracking, classification and identification of the 
three human targets deployed, as well as an attempt to detect other moving and stationary targets, 
such as other people, cars and any other targets of interest.  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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3. – Experiment Set Up 
 
In this section we describe the experiment set up, namely the experiment site selection, the SAR 
Satellite Imagery planning and the partners involved and their roles. 
3.1 – Experiment Site Selection 
 
Bearing in mind that most unlawful maritime activities involving small boats, such as illegal 
immigration, drugs trafficking, smuggling and terrorist activities can be better mitigated if the small 
boats are detected at an earlier stage while on open sea, the selection of open sea site scenarios for the 
experiment was an obvious option. The open sea trials were carried out a few nautical miles off the 
coast of Porto Corallo. This site was selected because it is under the jurisdiction of the Italian Air 
Force, which made the authorisation to fly easier to obtain and reduced the risk of incidents involving 
people since the area is closed to the public. For the same reason the tests along the coast also took 
place in the same area.    
 
3.1.1 – Open Sea/Coastal Waters Site in Porto Corallo 
 
The open sea/coastal waters site selected in Porto Corallo near Muravera and Villaputza, a few nautical 
miles off the coast, is illustrated in fig.1 in Green. The UAS flight plan and the Italian Airforce 
military airbase are also illustrated in fig.1. 
 
3.1.2 – Site Along the Coast in Porto Corallo 
 
For the same reasons the selected site for the tests along the coast is also the Porto Corallo area close to 
the coast indicated in Green in Figure 1.
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1 – The site of the experiment in Porto Corallo, Sardinia is the area in Green with vertices ABC, near Villaputza. 
The Italian Air Force military airbase of Decimomannu is also indicated in the map, as well as the UAS flight plan.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a square within the Green area where the experiment was carried out, indicating the 
coordinates of the vertices ABC of the Green triangle, as well as the vertices of a smaller area of 
operations represented by a square with vertices 1,2,3 and 4. 
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Figure 2 – Flight test area in Green with vertices ABC and operation zone represented by a square with vertices 1,2,3 and 
4.  
 
 
 
3.3 – SAR Satellite Imagery Planning 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the spaceborne SAR imagery planning. The footprints of the SAR Satellite 
images selected are shown in the google earth image of the region of Porto Corallo, Sardinia, Italy. 
 
The Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite imagery available at the time the planning was done 
comprised Radarsat2 (Spotlight and Ultrafine) and TerraSAR-X (Spotlight and Stripmap). Figure 3 
illustrates the Radarsat2 images available. Table-1 illustrates the SAR satellite images and image 
modes used in the different days of the experiment.  
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Figure 3 – The square in red corresponds to the area defined by Alenia Aeronautica. The circle in red is centred at the point 
Q with coordinates (39° 31’ 40”N / 09° 39’ 35”E) given by Alenia Aeronautica with radius of 5km. The rectangles in 
magenta are the Radarsat2-Spotlight images available in the period between 25Oct-15Nov. 2010. The frames are 10km x 
5km. The dates and times are given bellow in Table-1. 
 
 
Table 1- Radarsat2- Spotlight High Resolution 25-Oct.-15-Nov.-2010 
# Morning Satellite Pass Evening Satellite Pass 
1  2010-Oct-25 17:13:02.939 Ascending 
2 2010-Oct-26 05:26:51.424 DES  
3  2010-Oct-28 17:25:31.415 Ascending 
4  2010-Nov-01 17:08:53.725 Ascending 
5 2010-Nov-02 05:22:41.915 DES  
6  2010-Nov-04 17:21:21.781 Ascending 
7 2010-Nov-05 05:35:09.994 DES  
8 2010-Nov-09 05:18:32.266 DES  
9  2010-Nov-11 17:17:12.288 Ascending 
10 2010-Nov-12 05:31:00.781 DES  
11  2010-Nov-14 17:29:41.201 Ascending 
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Figure 4 – TerraSAR-X / Spotlight High Resolution frames centred at the point Q with coordinates (39° 31’ 40”N / 09° 39’ 
35”E) given by Alenia Aeronautica. The rectangles in red are the TerraSAR-X-Spotlight High Resolution images available 
in the period between 25Oct-15Nov. 2010. The frames are 10km x 5km. The dates and times are given bellow in Table-2. 
 
 
Table 2 – TerraSAR - Spotlight High Resolution 25-Oct.-15-Nov.-2010. 
# Morning Satellite Pass Evening Satellite Pass 
1  Start Date: 2010-10-25T17:14:46.078 
2 Start Date: 2010-10-29T05:28:36.182  
3  Start Date: 2010-10-30T17:23:19.111 
4  Start Date: 2010-10-31T17:06:13.240 
5 Start Date: 2010-11-03T05:37:08.788  
6 Start Date: 2010-11-04T05:20:03.032  
7  Start Date: 2010-11-05T17:14:46.078 
8 Start Date: 2010-11-09T05:28:36.182  
9  Start Date: 2010-11-10T17:23:19.111 
10  Start Date: 2010-11-11T17:06:13.240 
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The Radarsat2 and TerraSAR-X image modes used in the present experiment will be briefly reviewed 
in the next paragraphs.  
 
Radarsat2 - Spotlight Mode – The Spotlight Beams are intended for applications which require the 
best spatial resolution available from the RADARSAT-2 SAR system. In this mode the radar operates 
with the highest sampling rate, and so the ground swath coverage is limited to keep data rate within the 
recorder limits. Unlike the other modes, Spotlight images are also of fixed size in the along track 
direction.  
 
The ser of Spotlight Beams cover any area within the incidence angle range from 20 to 49 degrees. 
Each beam within the set images a swath width of at least 18 km. Spotlight images can only be 
generated in a single polarization, which can be either a linear co-polarization (HH or VV) or a linear 
cross-polarization (HV or VH). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Radarsart2 image modes. The Ultrafine and the Spotlight modes have been identified as the most suitable 
modes for this particular experiment.  
 
 
Radarsat2 - Single Beam Mode – Single beam mode is a stripmap SAR mode. In Single Beam 
operation, the beam elevation and profile are maintained constant throughout the data collection 
period. The following Single Beam modes are available: Standard, Wide, Fine, Multi-Look Fine, 
Ultra-Fine, Extended High (High Incidence), Extended Low (Low Incidence), Standard Quad 
Polarization and Fine Quad Polarization. We selected Ultra-Fine because it is the best compromise 
between swath coverage and resolution.  
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Radarsat2 - Ultra-Fine – The Ultra-Fine Resolution Beams are intended for applications which 
require very high spatial resolution. In this mode the radar operates with the highest sampling rate, and 
so the ground swath coverage is limited to keep data rate within the incidence angle from 20 to 49 
degrees. Each beam within the set images a swath width of at least 20 km. Ultra-Fine Resolution 
images can only be generated in a single cross-polarization , which can be either a linear co-
polarization (HH or VV) or a linear cross-polarization (HV or VH). 
 
The standard TerraSAR-X operational mode is the single receive antenna mode from which the 
following imaging modes can be retrieved: High Resolution Spotlight and Spotlight, StripMap, and 
ScanSAR. The single receive antenna mode uses a chirp 
bandwidth of up to 300 MHz. 
 
Figure 6 – Radarsart2 image modes. The Ultrafine and the Spotlight modes have been identified as the most suitable 
modes for this particular experiment.  
 
The SpotLight (SL) imaging modes use phased array beam steering in azimuth direction to increase 
the illumination time, i.e. the size of the synthetic aperture. This leads to a restriction in the image / 
scene size. Thus, the scene size is technically restricted to a defined size: 10 km x 10 km for the 
SpotLight mode and 10 km x 5 km (width x length) in the HighResolution SpotLight (HS) mode. 
 
This sophisticated imaging mode makes it possible to acquire data with up to 1 m resolution in the 
HighResolution SpotLight mode (acquired with a bandwidth of 300 MHz) and 2 m in the standard 
SpotLight mode. 
 
StripMap (SM) is the basic SAR imaging mode as known e.g. from ERS-1 and other radar satellites. 
The ground swath is illuminated with continuous sequence of pulses while the antenna beam is fixed in 
elevation and azimuth. This results in an image strip with a continuous image quality (in flight 
direction). StripMap dual polarisation data have a slightly lower spatial resolution and smaller swath 
than the single polarisation data. 
 
In StripMap mode, a spatial resolution of up to 3 m can be achieved. The standard scene size is 30 km 
x 50 m (width x length) in order to obtain manageable image files; however, acquisition length is 
extendable up to 1,650 km. 
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The spaceborne SAR image selected was a TerraSAR-X-Spotlight acquired on 29 Oct.2010 by 05:28 
UTC. Table 3 gives the basic characteristics of the SAR image.  
 
 
Table 3 – Spaceborne SAR image acquired over Porto Corallo, Sardinia, Italy.  
Date/Time Area Satellite / Mode Polarization Pass 
29.Oct. 2010 (AM) 
T 05:28:36.182 Porto Corallo- Sardinia TerraSAR-X / Spotlight HH Descending 
 
 
3.4 – Partners Involved and their Roles 
 
The partners involved in this experiment comprised the European Commission (EC) – Joint Research 
Centre (JRC). The role of each partner is briefly described next. 
 
3.4.1 - European Commission (EC) – Joint Research Centre (JRC)  
 
– The main role of the EC-JRC was the planning, set up, execution and the analysis of the data 
together with Alenia Aeronautica. This comprised: 
 
a.) the definition of the objectives,  
b.) the research methods used,  
c.) the ground truth data collection,  
d.) the analysis of the data and the conclusions of the experiment. 
 
 
3.4.2 – Alenia Aeronautica   
 
– The main role of Alenia Aeronautica comprised: 
 
a.) the deployment and operation of the boats used as targets. 
b.) the deployment and operation of the UAS Sky-Y. 
c.) the contacts with the Italian authorities, namely the Italian Air Force at Decimomannu Airbase.   
d.) the collection of ground truth data. 
e.) The analysis of the data and conclusions of the experiment. 
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4. – Experiment Execution 
 
4.1 – Modus Operandi  
 
The modus operandi of the trial was as follows: 
 
1.- JRC supplied Alenia Aeronautica with the footprint (frame) of the spaceborne SAR image to be 
acquired (TerraSAR-X-Spotlight), as well as the time of the SAR satellite pass. 
 
2.- Two boats were deployed in Porto Corallo, namely a 8-meter rubber boat and a 16-meter fishing 
boat, as well as the UAS Sky-Y, Sardinia. The 8-meter boat had a crew of two (Geremia Pepicelli from 
Alenia and Victor Silva from EC-JRC). The fishing boat had a crew of two fishermen.  
 
3.- The 2 boats travelled a couple of nautical miles to reach the test site. Once the test site was reached 
the 2 boats were steered at different speeds to allow the testing of the UAS detection and tracking 
systems under different conditions. 
 
 
4.2 – Ground Truth Data Collection 
 
The ground truth data collected comprised: 
 a.) the sea state. 
 b.) Data from the UAS sensors. 
            b.) the weather conditions and wind speed. 
 e.) Photos and movies of the boats involved in the experiment. 
 
 
4.3 – Means Involved in the Experiment 
 
The means involved in the experiment comprised a spaceborne SAR image (TerraSAR-X-Spotlight), 2 
boats (a 8-meter rubber boat and a 16-meter fishing boat) and the UAS Sky-Y.  
 
 
 
4.3.1 – Boats Deployed During the Experiment 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the 2 boats deployed as targets during the experiment. 
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Figure 7 – The 8-meter rubber boat at Porto Corallo marina just before the deployment by 6AM.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 – The 16-meter fishing boat at Porto Corallo marina after the experiment.   
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4.3.2 – UAS Sky-Y Alenia Aeronautica   
 
SKY-Y is a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Technologies Demonstrator. It is a dedicated 
platform for validating several key enabling technologies for a surveillance Unmanned Aerial System 
to be used in either a military and civil operational scenario. These include: innovative carbon ber 
composite construction, heavy fuel/JP-8 engine (automotive diesel derivative), advanced datalinks, 
surveillance sensor (EO/IR, Hyperspectral, Synthetic Aperture Radar) and mission management 
system able to relevant data treatment, elaboration, fusion and distribution by means of an 
interoperable Tactical Control Station. 
 
The SKY-Y is the system testbed for Alenia Aeronautica MALE product, now in early development. 
Finally, SKY-Y is the starting point for Molynx, the research project that aims to develop a High 
Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) system for civil and military applications. 
 
Table 4 gives a summary of the SKY-Y main characteristics and figures 9 and 10 illustrate the UAS 
SKY-Y deployed during the experiment. 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Summary of SKY-Y main characteristics. 
Dimensions 
Length 9.725 m 9.725 m 
Span 9.937 m 9.937 m 
Wing Area 10.785 m2 10.785 m2 
Weights 
MTOW 1200 Kg 1200 Kg 
OEW 800 Kg 800 Kg 
Max Fuel 250 Kg 250 Kg 
Max Payload 150 Kg 150 Kg 
Performance 
LOS Radius 100 nm 100 nm 
Max Range 500 nm 500 nm 
Altitude >25 kft >25 kft 
Endurance 14 h 14 h 
Payloads 
E0/IR Sensor  
Hyper-spectral sensor  
Synthetic Aperture Radar  
ESM/Elint  
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Figure 9 – The UAS Sky-Y at Decimomannu military airbase after the experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 10 – The payload of the Sky-Y was the Selex Galileo EOST Galileo 45, which comprises an Electro-Optical 
InfraRed (EO/IR) stabilized Turret, stabilization (4 axis), 20 μrad, an IR Camera (2 FOV) 3-5μm, Colour TV Camera 
(Visible), Spotter (Visible) and a Laser Designator (option). The total weight is 35kg. 
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5. – Preliminary Data Analysis 
 
5.1 – SAR Satellite Imagery Processing 
 
The high resolution spaceborne SAR image was analysed visually, since the resolution is good enough 
to allow visual analysis and the site it is too close to the coast, which makes automatic processing more 
difficult and prone to error due to artefacts caused by land targets.  
 
The SKY-Y images were also analysed visually.  
 
5.2 – Ground Truth Data  
 
This section briefly describes the Ground Truth data, namely the GPS positions of the boats deployed 
as targets during the experiment, photos of the boats, as well as other relevant ground truth data 
collected, including the weather conditions.     
 
5.2.1 – GPS coordinates of the boats deployed 
 
Tables 5 and 6 give the GPS coordinates of each boat deployed during the experiment. 
 
Table 5 – Ground Truth data collected during the experiment on 29 October 2010. 
Date: 29.Oct.2010 
Time:  5:28 UTC - (7:28AM LT) / Pass: Descending 
Satellite/Mode: TerraSAR-X / Spotlight 
Polarisation :  Dual 
Boats Type / Size Latitude  Longitude  
8-meter 
Rubber 
Boat 
 
N 39° 31’ 21.2” E 09° 39’ 31.7” 
16-meter 
Fishing 
Boat 
 
N 39 30.664 
N 39°30'39.84" 
E 09 39.108 
 E 09°39'6.48" 
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5.2.1 – SKY-Y Ground Truth Data 
 
Table 6 shows the 16-meter fishing boat as detected by the optical sensor of the SKY-Y. 
 
 
Table 6 – SKY-Y Ground Truth Data. 
Date: 29.Oct.2010 
Time:  5:28 UTC - (7:28AM LT)  
Platform: SKY-Y 
Boats Type / Size Latitude  Longitude  
16-meter 
Fishing 
Boat 
 
N 39° 30.664' 
N 39°30'39.84" 
E 09° 39.108' 
E 09°39'6.48" 
 
 
 
 
5.3 – Weather Conditions and Sea State 
 
The weather conditions in Porto Corallo are summarized in Table 7 bellow.  
 
 
Table 7 – Wind speed, wind direction and Temperature. 
Wind Speed 3 m/s 
Wind Direction East  
Temperature 14°C  
 
 
The Sea State can be estimated based on the photos and videos taken during the experiment. Figure 11 
shows a photo taken on 29 Oct. 2010 by 5:28 UTC (7:28AM LT), the approximate time of the SAR 
satellite pass. As it can be seen, the Seat State can be classified as a Beaufort Force 2, which 
corresponds to wave height between 0.2-0.5m and a wind speed of about 2-3m/s.  
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Figure 11 – Photo of the Sea taken from the 8-meter rubber boat by 5:28 UTC (7:28AM LT) on 29 Oct. 2010. The GPS 
coordinates of the photo are Latitude: 39° 31’ 21.0” N, Longitude 09° 39’ 27.8” E. 
 
 
 
5.4 – Verification of the Results 
 
This section briefly describes the verification of the targets detected in the spaceborne SAR image and 
in the SKY-Y UAS using the ground truth data collected during the experiment. 
 
 
5.4.1 – Targets Detected in the TerraSAR-X-Spotlight Image 
 
Figure 12 gives the positions of the 2 boats used as targets in the experiment at the approximate time 
of the SAR Satellite pass by 5:28 UTC. The Green pin shows the position of the 8-meter rubber boat 
(N 39° 31’ 21.2”, E 09° 39’ 31.7”) and the yellow pin gives the position of the 16-meter fishing boat 
(N 39°30'39.84", E 09°39'6.48").   
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Figure 12 – Google Earth positions of the 2 boats at the approximate time of the SAR Satellite pass by 5:28 UTC. The 
Green pin shows the position of the 8-meter rubber boat and the yellow pin gives the position of the 16-meter fishing boat.   
 
 
Figure 13 consists of a background (figure 12) and an overlay of a subset of the TerraSAR-X image 
acquired on 29 Oct. 2010 with the positions of the 2 boats used as targets indicated. There is a slight 
mismatch between the background and the SAR image, most likely due to SAR geo-referencing errors. 
The mismatch can also be seen in the coastline. Due to the scale of the image it is hard to see the SAR 
signatures of the boats.  
 
In order to check if the SAR signatures of the boats are noticeable in the SAR image, figure 13 was 
zoomed-in. Figure 14 shows the zoo-in of two subsets of figure 13, namely the area around the 
position of boat 1 and the area around the position of boat 2. As it can be seen, the SAR signature of 
target 1 (8-meter rubber boat) is not noticeable. However, the SAR signature of target 2 (16-meter 
fishing boat) can clearly be seen but it is not a strong SAR signature.     
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Figure 13 – On the background the Google Earth image from figure 12 with an overlay subset of the TerraSAR-X image 
with the positions of the 2 boats. As it can be seen there is a slight mismatch of the positions of the boats in the two images. 
The mismatch is due to geo-referencing errors of the SAR image. The mismatch between the coast lines confirms that 
error.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 – Zoom-in of figure 13. On the left we have the zoom-in of the position of boat 1. No SAR signature of target 1 
(8-meter rubber boat) can be seen. The figure on the right shows the SAR signature of boat 2 (16-meter fishing boat).  
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5.4.2 – Targets Detected and Tracked by the SKY-Y 
 
The SKY-Y payload was able to detect, track and classify the two boats deployed as targets. The next 
figures show several images acquired by the SKY-Y payload during the experiment. Figure 15 and 16 
show the 8-meter rubber boat .This shows the capability of the SKY-Y to detect small rubber boats 
from relatively high altitudes (e.g. >3,000 meters). The SKY-Y was able to detect the 8-meter rubber 
boat from relatively high altitudes, track it and classify the type of boat. The boat was steered at 
increasingly high speeds to test the UAS capability to automatically detect and track targets at high 
speeds. The detection and classification of the targets was successful. The direct identification of the 
target would have required a UAS flight at lower altitude. The images acquired by the different UAS 
sensors were acquired at relatively high altitude, well above 3,000m. Since the SKY-Y was not fitted 
with Satcom for BLOS navigation, the minimum UAS flight altitude allowed was about 3,000m to 
keep the Line of Sight with the Remote Control Station located at Decimomannu Airbase. Without that 
limitation the UAS would have been allowed to fly much lower than 3,000m and direct identification 
of the target.   
 
 
 
Figure 15 – Boat Spotter, LRTV LIVE.  
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The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 15 is given next. 
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Figure 16 – Boat Spotter, LRTV LIVE.   
 
 
The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 16 is given next. 
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Figure 17 – Ship (Spotter), TVC LIVE.
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The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 17 is given next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the potential of UAS for ship detection, classification and identification. The 
image was acquired from an altitude well above 3,000m because the UAS was not allowed to fly 
bellow 3,000 meters. A lower altitude flight would have allowed the acquisition of images with better 
quality and the possibility to identify the target, and eventually some of the crew members. 
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Figure 18 – Ship (Spotter), TVC LIVE. 
 
The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 18 is given next. 
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Figure 19 – Refugees (Spotter), LRTV LIVE.
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The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 19 is given next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the UAS capability to detect people from high altitudes (well above 
3,000m). This is an important capability to mitigate maritime piracy because it allows the detection of 
the crew members and any weapons they may carry. It is also useful to mitigate illegal immigration, 
drugs trafficking and smuggling. It could also be useful for counter-terrorism operations since it allows 
the detection of people and weapons. It should be noted that a lower altitude flight would provide a 
much better quality image with the potential to identify the crew members.  
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Figure 20 – Refugees (Spotter), LRTV LIVE. 
 
The SKY-Y information associated to the image in figure 20 is given next. 
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5.4.3 – SKY-Y Operational Limitations 
 
It should be noted that all the SKY-Y images presented in this report were acquired from a relatively 
high altitude between 3km and 5km due to the topography (e.g. high mountains) of Sardinia. The area 
between Decimomannu military airbase and Porto Corallo is a mountainous area as illustrated in figure 
21. The Remote Control Station of the SKY-Y was based at Decimomannu airbase. In order to avoid 
any loss of communications between the SKY-Y Control Station and the SKY-Y, the SKY-Y was not 
allowed to fly bellow 3km. Most of the images presented in this report were acquired from an altitude 
well above 3km. In most operational missions, this kind of limitation does not exist. If the SKY-Y 
were allowed to fly at lower altitudes the resolution and quality of the images acquired would be 
significantly better. Flying at lower altitudes would allow better classification and even the 
identification of some targets.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 – Mountainous area between Decimomannu airbase and Porto Corallo. Since the SKY-Y Remote Control 
Station was based at Decimomannu airbase the SKY-Y was not allowed to fly bellow 3km.
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5.5 – Quantitative Analysis of the Spaceborne SAR Image  
 
In order to allow a quantitative analysis of the data, the spaceborne SAR image was calibrated using 
ESA’s NEST software package, version 4B. The input was the SAR image acquired and the output 
was the Radiometric Calibration (Sigma Naught (σ°)) expressed in terms of intensity and in decibel 
(dB), the Radar Brightness (β°) and the Radiometric Normalisation (gamma naught (γ°)). 
5.5.1 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlight, 29Oct.2010 (5:28 UTC), Porto Corallo, 
Sardinia-Italy. 
  
Figure 22 illustrates the Intensity band of a subset of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010). 
 
Figure 22 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) - Intensity band.
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Figure 23 illustrates the Sigma Naught Coefficient of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) 
expressed in terms of intensity and decibel (dB). 
 
Figure 23 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) - On the left, the Sigma Naught (σ°) (intensity) and on the 
right, the Sigma Naught (σ°) (dB).  
 
 
Figure 24 illustrates the Radar Brightness (Beta Naught (β°)), and the radiometric normalisation 
(Gamma Naught (γ°)) of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) expressed in dB. 
 
Figure 24 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) - On the left, the Beta Naught (β°) and on the right, the Gamma 
Naught (γ°) (dB).
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Figure 25 shows the Sigma Naught (σ°) in dB after some colour manipulation and the histogram of the 
Sigma Naught (σ°) image.  
 
Figure 25 – TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010) - On the top left the Sigma Naught (σ°) after colour 
manipulation to enhance the targets and on the top right, the corresponding histogram. On the bottom, we can see the 
histogram of the image.  
 
 
Table 8 gives the statistics of the Sigma Naught (σ°) TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (29Oct.2010). The 
Sigma Naught (σ°) range from -52.0 dB up to 32.2 dB. The Mean value is -20.5 dB, the Median is -
20.0 dB and the standard deviation is 6.4 dB. 
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Table 8 – Statistics of the TerraSAR-X-Spotlgiht image (17May2010) (05:27 UTC) 
Statistics Values Unit 
Only ROI-Mask pixels considered:   
Number of pixels total:        
Number of considered pixels:  
Ratio of considered pixels:    
No 
62373200 
44679677 
71.63% 
 
Minimum:      
Maximum:    
-52.037662506103516 
32.18838119506836  
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
Mean:          
Median:       
Std-Dev:      
Coefficient of Variation:  
-20.526217424764447 
-20.050240460889945 
6.422167829350328  
-0.3128763388130881 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
intensity_db 
 
Checking the radar backscattering coefficient of the targets (small boats) detected in section 1 (Fig. 
25), we get values ranging from -9.1 dB up to -5.0 dB. The analysis of the Sigma Naught values (σ°) 
of the targets and the area around the targets shows a significant contrast.  
 
5.6 – Summary of the Preliminary Analysis of the Spaceborne 
SAR Image  
 
This experiment involved one spaceborne SAR image TerraSAR-X-Spotlight. One of the 2 boats 
deployed as targets was detected in the image. Table 9 summarises the characteristics of the SAR 
image acquired and the targets detected.  
 
Table 9 –  List of SAR Satellite Images acquired during the experiment and detected boats. 
Date / Time Place Satellite / Mode Ground Truth Data Detected Boats 
ITALY (Porto Corallo - Sardinia) 
29.Oct.2010 (AM) Sardinia - Italy TerraSAR-X / Spotlight GPS/Photos/Movies 1 out of 2  
 
Table 10 gives the minimum and maximum Sigma Naught (σ°) of the targets detected in each SAR 
image. 
 
Table 10 – Minimum and maximum Sigma Naught (σ°) of the targets detected in each SAR image. 
Date /Time UTC (LT)/Pass Satellite / Image Mode / Polarisation Sigma Naught (σ°) Min / Max
29.Oct.2010/5:28UTC(7:28AM LT)/ DES TerraSAR-X / Spotlight / HH -9.1dB / -5.0dB 
 
 
The SAR signatures of the boats deployed were very weak. Some possible reasons to explain such 
weak signatures are the sea state, the wind speed, the incidence angle and the type and materials. 
Another possible reason is the processing at DLR.    
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6. – Preliminary Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the results of this coupled UAS/Spaceborne SAR experiment shows a promising 
potential for the use of UAS for maritime surveillance. UAS can be integrated into the airborne 
building block of maritime surveillance systems to complement the existing assets, increase system 
performance and improve the overall maritime domain awareness. The main perceived maritime 
security and safety threats comprise piracy, terrorist and military threats, weapons 
proliferation/smuggling, drugs trafficking, illegal immigration, unlawful use of containers, attacks to 
critical infrastructures and illegal fishing. The main maritime security and safety gaps include a lack of 
technologies with the capability of detecting small targets (e.g. small boats), a lack of wide area and 
persistent maritime surveillance, a lack of coordination and information sharing, limited 
interoperability, a lack of containers security, a lack of persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures 
and early warning systems. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are an emerging technology with 
strong potential to mitigate the above mentioned threats by filing in the main maritime security and 
safety gaps listed earlier. For instance, the wide range of potential applications of UAS to maritime 
surveillance includes, but is not limited to: 
 
• ─ detection, classification and identification of small boats,  
• ─ persistent maritime surveillance,  
• ─ use as communications relays,  
• ─ persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures,  
• ─ early warning systems,  
• ─ COMINT and ELINT collection, etc..  
 
Table 11 illustrates the mapping of maritime security/safety threats vs gaps and summarises the main 
potential applications of UAS to maritime surveillance.  
 
The above mentioned potential applications of UAS to the Maritime Domain will be addressed in turn 
in more detail next. 
 
• ─ Detection, classification and identification of small boats – The capability of detecting, classifying 
and identifying small targets (e.g. small boats) is among the key technologies required to improve 
maritime domain awareness. This capability is critical to mitigate piracy, illegal immigration, drugs 
trafficking, weapons smuggling, illegal fishing, terrorism and critical infrastructure. Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide this capability more efficiently and at a lower cost than any other 
existing technology.     
 
• ─ Persistent maritime surveillance – With the continuous improvements of UAS technologies, such 
as platforms, sensors, collision avoidance systems, command and control systems, 
telecommunications, etc., UAS are increasing their autonomy, endurance and flexibility. These 
characteristics are very important for persistent maritime surveillance. UAS can be launched from 
land, ships, aircraft and technologies to launch UAS from submarines are currently under 
development. UAS have distinct advantages over other existing technologies for persistent maritime 
surveillance in terms of autonomy/endurance (the Global Surveyor has an autonomy of 1 week), cost 
(e.g. as the autonomy of UAS increases, the number of staff required to operate UAS decreases), risk 
(e.g. if the UAS crashes the crew is not at risk), flexibility (e.g. they can be launched from a ship 
reducing the time to reach potential threats), etc..  
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• ─ Communications relays – UAS are being used as communication relays, mainly in military 
context, but have the potential to play a similar role in Civil context in several situations, such as to 
replace satellite communications or as a redundant system over any location on Earth. The main 
advantages of using UAS as communication relays is that airborne communication relays mitigate 
kinetic and noise jamming threats to satellite communications uplinks by providing an alternative set 
of links either directly to surface-based terminals or to satellites beyond the range of threats. They are 
less susceptible to noise jamming threats than satellites because an adversary has to detect, geolocate 
and track the airborne asset and operate within line of sight of the receive antenna main beam.  
 
• ─ Persistent surveillance of critical infrastructures – The security of critical infrastructures, such as 
nuclear power plants, refineries, ports, etc. requires persistent surveillance. UAS can play an important 
role in providing persistent surveillance over critical infrastructures and over a wide area around the 
critical infrastructure. Some advantages of UAS over other existing technologies, such as ground-
based assets (e.g. video cameras, alarm systems, manned aircraft, etc.), comprise the security of the 
UAS (e.g. hardly can be damaged or switched off as any ground-based asset), the area covered by a 
UAS (e.g. it is larger than the area covered by any ground-based asset), the cost (e.g. UAS is cheaper 
than manned aircraft with similar capability), etc..    
 
• ─ Early warning systems – UAS have the potential to be used as part of an integrated system of 
systems for early warning. A UAS can provide information about a given area at a fraction of the cost 
of alternative means. Formation flying of UAS can cover a wide maritime area. It is reasonable to 
assume that in a foreseeable future with the advent of UAS with increased autonomy, the operations 
cost of UAS will likely decrease, making them increasingly more attractive. 
 
• ─ COMINT and ELINT collection – SIGNal INTelligence (SIGNINT) can be divided into two 
categories, namely COMINT and ELINT. COMINT stands for Communication Intelligence and 
ELINT for Electronic Intelligence. Collection of COMINT is passive. Exploitation of COMINT 
requires a human operator, which implies COMINT UAS are suitable for COMINT and ELINT 
collection in different scenarios,   
 
The relatively reduced amount of data collected and analysed during this experiment and the lessons 
learned do not allow drawing final conclusions about the feasibility of using Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS) for maritime surveillance. However, this experiment allowed hands-on experience 
with UAS technologies and significantly improved the awareness for its applications to maritime 
surveillance and related issues involved, including its potential, the feasibility, as well as the limiting 
and enabling factors. These different aspects will now be analysed in turn in the next sections.   
 
Table 11 illustrates the mapping of the main maritime security threats and gaps, as well as the main 
priorities in terms of the different technologies involved in maritime surveillance. For each maritime 
threat, the technologies required to fill in each gap is indicated and its priority is expressed in a range 
of numbers (1 to 3, 1 = Maximum Priority, 2 = Medium Priority, 3 = Low Priority) and colours (Red = 
Maximum Priority, Orange = Medium Priority, Green = Low Priority). The main technologies 
involved in maritime surveillance are listed on the bottom of figure 4 and are reproduced here for 
convenience of the reader: 1.- Reporting Systems, 2.- Sensors, 3.- Platforms, 4.- Communications, 5.- 
Data Fusion & Sharing, 6.- Intelligence and 7.- Databases. For example, the mitigation of the main 
threat Piracy requires filling in several maritime security gaps (e.g. lack of persistent surveillance, lack 
of wide-are maritime surveillance, lack of small boat detection, lack of Early Warning Systems, and 
lack of Information Sharing with maximum priority (1- Red) and among the required technologies 
listed are UAS, LTAAV, GEO-HR, etc. Concerning the remaining two gaps (Limited Interoperability 
and Containers Security) they are less relevant to mitigate Piracy, hence the priority for Limited 
Interoperability is 2-Orange and for Containers Security is 3- Green. 
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Table 11 – The Main Maritime Security and Safety Threats vs Gaps and the technologies that can be used to mitigate them. 
Maritime Security Main Threats / Gaps
Gaps→
↓Threats
Lack  o f Risk 
As sessment
Capab ility
La ck of 
Persiste nt 
Surveilla nce
La ck of Wid e-
Area su rve illanc e
La ck of  Small 
Boat  De tecti on
Lack o f Earl y 
Warn ing  
Sys tems
L ack of  
In forma tion
Sh arin g
L imi ted 
In terop era bility
Lac k of 
Co ntai ners
Se cur ity
• Piracy
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, GEO-HR
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
UAS, LTAV, 
+ ...
Coord in ation
& Sharing  + ...
Inter opera bility
Optimisation  + ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Terro rism
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS,  L TAV, 
GEO-HR + ...
SAR, AIS
GEO-HR + ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Inter opera bility
Optimisation  + ...
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Wea pon s of
M ass Dest ru ctio n 
Smugg ling
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Drug s
Traffic king
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Illega l
Immigratio n
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Critic al
I nfrastruc ture
Secu rit y
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
UAS, LT AV,GEO-
HR + ...
SAR, AIS
+ ...
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ... + ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
Intelligence
+ ...
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2,  3, 6 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Illega l
Fish ing
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
AI S+SAR, 
UAS,LTAV + ...
SAR, AIS, GEO-
HR+ .. .
UAS, USV, LTAV
+ ...
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
Intelligence
+ . ..
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
• Un lawf ul Use of  
Co nta iners
(Secur ity)
UAS, LTAV,G EO-
HR + . ..
GPS Tr acking
+ .. .
Intelligence
+ ...
Inte ligen ce
+ ...
GPS, Int rusion 
Det ection, Se al 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 4, 6, 7 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 1, 2, 3 1,2,3,4,5,6 4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
(-) Priority (+) Not Rel evant
SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGIES
1.- Reporti ng  
Systems 
2. -Sensors 3. -P latforms 4. - Communications 5.- Data Fusion
& Sharing
6. -I ntelli gence 7. -Databases
JRC - Alenia Aeronautica Coupled UAS / Spaceborne SAR Campaign Oct. 2010 Page 39  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
JRC - Alenia Aeronautica Coupled UAS / Spaceborne SAR Campaign Oct. 2010 Page 40  
 
 
6.1 – Hands-on experience with UAS technologies and its 
applications to maritime surveillance 
 
This coupled UAS/Spaceborne SAR campaign was a unique opportunity to acquire hands–on 
experience with UAS technologies and learn about the main issues related to its applications to 
maritime surveillance. From the planning phase up to the execution of the UAS flight and landing 
there are several factors that need to be carefully analysed and taken into account. A summary of the 
main issues identified in this experiment is given next. 
  
1.- Selection of the Experiment Area /Authorisation to Fly – For the time being UAS can only be 
flown in restricted areas usually under control of national authorities, often the military. This is due to 
the risks that a UAS can pose to human life and property. In the present case, an area under the 
authority of the Italian Air Force in Porto Corallo, Sardinia-Italy, was used. The authorisation to fly 
was easy to obtain because the selected area is under the authority of the Italian Air Force and Alenia 
Aeronautica cooperates with the Italian Airforce in several UAS projects. Also the Italian Air Force 
already knows the main characteristics of the SKY-Y. For areas under the jurisdiction of the civilian 
authorities the authorisation to fly would have required a lengthy bureaucratic process and would have 
taken a lot longer to obtain. Figure 26 indicates the area of the experiment (in Green), as well as the 
Decimomannu airbase and the UAS flight plan.  
 
2.- UAS Communications Issues – The SKY-Y used in the experiment was not equipped with a 
Satcom antenna. Hence, it required Line-Of-Sight (LOS) operation. Since the military airbase from 
where the SKY-Y took-off (Decimomannu airbase) is located about 80km from Porto Corallo where 
the experiment took place and the two locations are separated by mountains, in order to keep LOS 
communications with the Remote Control Station the UAS was not allowed to fly bellow an altitude of 
3km. Figure 21 illustrates the mountains between Decimomannu and Porto Corallo. The LOS 
communications also limit the range of operation of the UAS. Satcom communications is essential for 
maritime surveillance. LOS implies limited range of operation and often also limit the minimum 
altitude of flight.    
 
3.- Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) – The SKY-Y used in the experiment had no SAR sensor. 
However, the installation of a SAR sensor was already planned. A SAR sensor is essential for 
maritime surveillance since it allows 24/7 operations regardless of the weather conditions. The main 
limiting factor that can prevent the UAS from flying is the wind speed.  
 
4.- Automatic Identification System (AIS) Receiver – The SKY-Y used in the experiment was not 
equipped with an AIS receiver. For maritime surveillance operations an AIS receiver is a very 
important tool since it allows the automatic identification of most ships allowing the UAS to 
concentrate on non-identified ships. Alenia Aeronautic has plans to install an AIS receiver on their 
UAS for maritime surveillance. 
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Figure 26 – Area of the experiment in Green. Decimomannu militaUAS flight plan are also indicated. 
 
 
6.2 – Potential of UAS for Maritime Surveillance 
 
UAS technologies are relatively recent and involve a wide range of fields spanning from aeronautics 
and sensors technologies to satellite communications and other engineering disciplines. Innovations in 
each of the fields involved are emerging by the day. UAS still have a long way to go before they 
become mature and their use fully operational. For the time being UAS are mainly used for military 
applications. However, a large number of non-military UAS applications have been identified by 
stakeholders and there are several studies and demonstration flights foreseen for the near future.    
 
Maritime surveillance is one of the most challenging and promising fields of application of UAS. The 
challenges are due to the very demanding conditions under which the UAS must operate over sea and 
the requirements for safe operation. 
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The present UAS experiment has unveiled some of the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance. 
The UAS tests performed during this experiment include: 
 
1 – Detection of a Small rubber Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
2 – Tracking of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
3 – Classification of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
4 – Identification of a Small Boat and a Fishing Ship, 
5 – Detection and Tracking of People on the Beach, 
 
Despite the operational requirement that prevented the UAS from flying bellow 3km, the experiment 
has confirmed the capability of UAS for small boat detection, tracking and classification, as well as the 
capability for people detection and tracking. Concerning the identification of the targets, the 
characteristics of the images acquired during this mission suggest that flying at lower altitudes the 
UAS images would allow the identification of the targets. The UAS images can be seen from Figure 
15 to 20. 
 
 
 
6.2.1 – Advantages of UAS for maritime Surveillance 
 
Some of the advantages of using UAS for maritime surveillance have been described in the literature 
and are summarized bellow.  
 
● 1.- One potential benefit of UAS is that they could fill in a gap in current maritime 
surveillance by improving coverage. 
● 2.- The range of UAS is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or 
stationary surveillance equipment. 
● 3.- Eletro-Optical InfraRed (EOIR) sensors (cameras) can identify small size objects from 
very high altitudes (high resolution). 
● 4.- UAS can provide precise and near-real-time imagery to a ground control operator, who 
would then disseminate that information so that informed decisions regarding the 
deployment of border patrol agents can be made quickly. 
● 5.- Long endurance UAS used along the border can fly for more than 30 hours up to 
several days without having to refuel, compared with manned helicopter’s average 
flight time of just over 2 hours. 
● 6.- The ability of UAS to loiter for prolonged periods of time has important operational 
advantages over manned aircraft. 
● 7.- The longer flight times of UAS means that sustained coverage over a previously 
exposed area may improve maritime security. 
● 8.- The range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or 
stationary surveillance equipment. Nevertheless, the extended range and endurance of 
UAVs may lessen the burdens on human resources at the borders. 
● 9.- UAS accidents do not risk the lives of pilots, as do the helicopters and aircraft currently used by 
Coast Guards for border patrolling. 
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6.2.2 – Possible Drawbacks of using UAS for maritime Surveillance 
 
UAS also have disadvantages; some of them are briefly described next. 
 
● 1.- There have been concerns regarding the high accident rate of UAS, which can be multiple times 
higher than that of manned aircraft. Because UAS technology is still evolving, there is less 
redundancy built into the operating system of UAS than of manned aircraft and until redundant 
systems are perfected mishap rates are expected to remain high.  
 
● 2.- If control systems fail in a manned aircraft, a well-trained pilot is better positioned to find the 
source of the problem because of his/her physical proximity. If a UAS encountered a similar system 
failure, or if a UAS landing was attempted during difficult weather conditions, the ground control 
pilot would be at a disadvantage because he or she is removed from the event. Unlike a manned pilot, 
the remote pilot would not be able to assess important sensory information such as wind speed. 
 
● 3.- Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAS surveillance capability, especially 
UAS equipped with only an EO camera and Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), because cloudy 
conditions and high humidity climates can distort the imagery produced by EO and FLIR equipment. 
The effects of extreme climatic or atmospheric conditions on sensors reportedly can be mitigated with 
the outfit of one synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system and a moving target indicator (MTI) radar. 
However, adding SAR and MTI to a UAS platform would increase the costs associated with using 
UAS. 
 
● 4.- Depending on the type of UAS, the costs of operating a UAS can be higher than the costs of 
operating a manned aircraft. This is because some types of UAS require a significant amount of 
logistical support and specialized operator and maintenance training. Operating one UAS may require 
a crew of up to 20 support personnel. The high comparative costs of operating some sophisticated 
types of UAS may be offset somewhat by their comparatively lower unit costs.  
 
6.3 – Main Limiting Factors Preventing the Use of UAS 
 
Several pre-requisites must be satisfied to render the UAS a viable, cost-effective and regulated 
alternative to existing resources. Major civil and commercial market barriers include: 
 
● ─ Single European Sky 
● ─ Sense and Avoid technologies 
● ─ Command and Control Technologies Reliability 
● ─ Communications (Bandwidth, LOS, BLOS)  
 ● ─ Lack of airspace regulation that covers all types of UAV systems (encompassing ‘sense and avoid’, 
airspace integration and airworthiness issues) 
 ● ─ Affordability - price and customization issues (e.g. commercial off-the-shelf, open modular architecture) 
● ─ Lack of efforts to establish joint customer requirements (although this is gradually changing)  
● ─ Liability for civil operation  
● ─ Capacity for payload flexibility  
● ─ Lack of sufficient secure non-military frequencies for civil operation  
● ─ Perceived reliability (e.g. vehicle attrition rate vs. manned aircraft)  
● ─ Operator training issues  
● ─ Recognition/customer perception of the UAV market  
● ─ Technology developments for multi-mission capability  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6.4 – UAS Key Enabling Technologies 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the components of a typical UAV System, showing some of the capabilities 
needed and the enabling technologies required for performing a given mission. Any UAV mission 
involves many capabilities and technologies. Due to the depicted system complexity the main key 
players, such as the US Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies have started to use the term 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) in place of UAV. 
 
 
Figure 27 – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System. Enabled by: Autonomous Mission Management, Reliable Flight Systems, 
avigation Accurate Systems, Terrain Avoidance, Power and Propulsion 
ome UAS key enabling technologies are listed below.   
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Table 12 gives a more detailed description of other critical technologies for emerging autonomous 
UAV systems both civil and military. Most of the technologies mentioned in Table 12 apply both to 
ivil and military UAV systems. 
Table 12 – Key Enabling Technologies (from SG ystems). 
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Figure 28 summarises system element designs needed to transition from current to next-generation 
autonomous UAV systems for civilian and military UAS. 
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Figure 28 – System Element Designs Needed to Transition from Current to Next-Generation Autonomous UAV Systems. 
 
 
These new paradigms are a combination of system attributes and technological capabilities. For 
instance, the data fusion, secure anti-jam, and coordinated multi-vehicle control require technological 
development as well as specific system development to bring full maturity to unmanned systems. 
 
Finally, very small Micro UAVs (MAVs) and relatively large, sophisticated UCAV systems are 
examples of the range of UAVs that are applying the new platforms, payloads, onboard processing, 
communications, etc. to create next generation automated UAVs. It is with these new platforms, 
payloads, etc. that both UCAVs and MAV will be able to address similar operational challenges 
including: 
 
   ● ─ Mixed operation with other assets: 
    • Deconfliction, collision avoidance, C4I integration. 
   ● ─ Operation over populated areas: 
    • Safety issues. 
   ● ─ Need to reduce reliance on communications: 
    • UCAV – countermeasures. 
    • MAV – limited size and power. 
    • Limited line of sight environment. 
   ● ─ Need a fully integrated system: 
    • MAV propulsion/power generation still critical. 
    • Operator machine interface critical. 
    • All weather operations. 
    • Survivability. 
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6.5 – Mission Readiness 
6.5.1 – Mission Readiness Summary 
 
This section summarises civil UAV mission readiness. The purpose of Mission Readiness is to assess 
the readiness status of the different technologies involved in UAS. In the present case this civil UAV 
mission readiness based on technology maturation forecasts that meet or exceed the desired, or 
required, capabilities identified by the user community.  
 
Figure 29 summarises the mission readiness time forecasts for the different technologies. The 
technologies annotated with an asterisk (*) are shown within the figure with maturation forecasts based 
on development targets expressed in the US Department of Defences’ UAV Roadmap document.  
 
The purpose of the chart is to be able to identify when the capability to fly a particular mission can be 
expected as a function of time. The left-most end is the least probable and the right end the most 
probable timeframe.  
 
 
Figure 29 - Technology Maturation Summaries in Terms of Mission-Derived Capabilities.
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6.6 – Small Boat Detection in SAR Satellite Imagery 
 
The use of spaceborne SAR imagery for small boat detection requires additional small boat detection 
experiments under different conditions using different methods. It is not possible to draw final 
conclusions based on a limited number of small boat detection experiments, which are not 
representative of the multiple possible scenarios. 
 
 
 
6.7 – Limitations of current State-of-the-Art SAR Satellite 
technology 
 
The main limitations of current State-of-the-Art spaceborne SAR imagery for maritime surveillance, in 
particular aimed at small boat detection, are: 
 
1. - SAR satellites repeat cycles do not allow the coverage of the same area at the required time 
intervals. Constellations of SAR satellites could be a solution. 
 
2. - The conflict between resolution and image swath. High resolution is required to detect small boats. 
However, the high resolution images have small swaths. Maritime surveillance with high resolution 
images would require a large number of images to cover wide maritime areas, which is very expensive 
and for the time being technically not feasible. Intelligence data can play an important role by 
indicating an approximate position of suspicious non cooperative targets, therefore reducing the 
surveillance area, which can then be imaged using high resolution images. 
 
3.- Spaceborne high resolution SAR imagery acquisition times are long enough to allow significant 
motion of the target during the acquisition time degrading the quality of the image. Further research 
efforts are needed to develop new sensors and platforms. As far as sensors are concerned, shorter 
integration times are needed to prevent the blurring effect caused by the motion of the targets. 
Regarding the platforms, more platforms are needed to allow lower repeat cycles and improved 
coverage.
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7. – Plans for Future Work 
 
The controlled experiments carried out by the EC-JRC together with Alenia Aeronautica in Sardinia-
Italy comprised the deployment of a UAS (SKY-Y), one small 8-meter rubber boat and a 16-meter 
fishing vessel. A TerraSAR-X-Spotlight image was acquired and several EOIR images collected by the 
SKY-Y. The experiment unveiled the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance, in particular for 
detection, tracking, classification and possible identification of small targets. The UAS was able to 
detect, track and classify small targets, such as small boats and people. For low UAS altitude flights 
identification may be possible in some cases. The small 8-meter rubber boat was not detected in the 
spaceborne SAR image.    
 
The small boat detection trials carried out by the JRC were very successful since most small boats 
deployed during the experiments were detected in different sea states, wind speeds and geographical 
locations. The several small boat detection campaigns conducted by the EC-JRC seem to suggest that 
the probability of detection of small boats in spaceborne SAR images strongly depends on factors, 
such as the sea state, the wind speed, the type of boat (shape and materials), the weather conditions, 
etc.. The results of the experiments conducted thus far are no enough to draw final conclusions about 
the feasibility of using spaceborne SAR imagery for small boat detection. However, the experiments 
have an overall positive outcome because they indicate that under suitable sea state and wind speed 
conditions it is possible to detect small boats using spaceborne SAR. The estimation of the probability 
of detection of small boats in spaceborne SAR images requires a large number of experiments under 
different circumstances (e.g. sea state, wind speed, characteristics of the targets, image type and mode, 
etc.).   
 
Future plans include additional UAS experiments to asses its potential for maritime surveillance.  
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Abstract 
The European maritime area is one of Europe’s most important assets with regard to resources, security and ultimately 
prosperity of the Member States. A significant part of Europe’s economy relies directly or indirectly on it. It is not just the 
shipping or fisheries industries and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and ports, marine equipment and offshore 
energy, maritime and coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, blue biotech and the protection of the 
marine environment. The European maritime area faces several risks and threats posed by unlawful activities, such as drugs 
trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Piracy in international waters also constitutes a threat 
to Europe since it can disrupt the maritime transport chain. These risks and threats can endanger human lives, marine resources 
and the environment, as well as significantly disrupt the transport chain and global and local security. It is anticipated that these 
risks and threats will endure in the mid and long run. In order to keep Europe as a world leader in the global maritime economy, 
an effective integrated/interoperable, sustainable maritime surveillance system and situational awareness are needed. 
A significant number of unlawful maritime activities, such as illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, smuggling, piracy and 
terrorism involve mainly small boats, because small boats are faster and more difficult to detect using conventional means. 
Hence, it is very important to find out the feasibility of using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for small boat detection, tracking, 
classification and identification, as well as to study the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance. Since 2010 the EC-JRC has 
carried out a number of UAS maritime surveillance campaigns to study the potential of UAS for maritime surveillance, in 
particular for small boat detection. This report presents the results and conclusions of the JRC - Alenia Aeronautica Coupled UAS 
and Spaceborne SAR campaign carried out in Oct. 2010 in Porto Corallo, Sardinia, Italy. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy 
cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and 
sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food 
security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security 
including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
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